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GROUND LOST AND FOUND IN CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY IN ENGLAND
ROGER J. TRAYNOR
DISCOVERY in criminal cases is gaining 
ground in the United
States. Discovery at the trial in both federal and state pros-
ecutions has been significantly expanded in consequence of deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court that implement the
constitutional right to a fair trial.' Pretrial discovery, though
still governed by inadequate and arbitrary rules in federal and
in many state prosecutions, is expanding in some states, most
markedly in California. I have commented on these trends in
the New York University Law Review2 on the basis of some
firsthand knowledge. Against that background I venture now
to note what appears from an American perspective as salient
developments in criminal discovery in England.
Across England's long and turbulent history, the very
abuses of the law have led not only to specific reforms but to
enduring attitudes conducive to a large-souled concept of fair
trial. There are no formal rules for criminal discovery in English
law, but the preliminary hearing,8 originally designed to correct
particular abuses and itself in turn abused, led to a series of
pragmatic reforms, notably in the nineteenth century, that made
of it an avenue of discovery for the defense. The preliminary
hearing is not defined as a discovery procedure, and it is of
narrow application. Nevertheless, it is of such far-reaching prom-
ise as to be potentially responsive to Professor Louisell's descrip-
tion of it as "the quintessence of discovery.""
It is a tribute to such a climate of law and orderly evolution
neither to take it for granted nor to grant it an unrealistic per-
Roger J. Traynor is Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California.
This article was prepared in sequence of an Anglo-American conference on
criminal procedure held in London, July 1963, sponsored by the Institute of
Judicial Administration. There are several references in the footnotes to un-
published memoranda and to minutes of the conference that are on file with
Professor Delmar Karlen, Director of the Institute of Judicial Administration.
1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264, 269 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 3 1-32 (1957); Pyle v. Kansas, 317
U.S. 213, 216 (1942).
2. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
228 (1964).
3. This procedure is variously known as committal proceedings, preliminary
investigation, examination, or inquiry. Throughout this comparative study these
terms have been transposed into the nearest American equivalent, the preliminary
hearing, in the interest of ready comparison.
4. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 Calif. L.
Rev. 56, 64 (1961).
4
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fection. No climate is perfect or even reassurringly predictable.
Hence the notes that follow, proceeding from the formidable
records of past storm and lull to a current weather report, are
not uniformly rose-colored any more than are the notes on the
variegated scene in the United States. Such variety may com-
plicate comparative studies but it fortunately also enriches
them, for we are likely to draw useful lessons as much by virtue
of our faults as by virtue of our virtues. Of course, in a process
still as experimental as that of discovery, some disagreement is
inevitable as to what is virtue and what is not. Still, it would
be meanly pedantic to make merely descriptive comparisons
without setting forth provisional views that, even if eventually
proved to be misconceptions, could serve at least to elicit correct
information and perhaps also to stimulate enough experiment to
yield a definitive answer.
It is helpful to the formulation of even provisional views
to retrace the modern preliminary hearing in England back to
its origins in the sixteenth century. In 1554, Parliament enacted
a statute to correct the evil that "the greatest and noblest
offenders" 5 too often remained unpunished because of the un-
restrained power of justices of the peace to grant bail." The
statute provided that henceforth justices of the peace could
exercise such power only after taking preliminary depositions
of witnesses." The preliminary examination was extended the
following year to cases involving prisoners who were not to
be granted bail.8 In this early procedure, the magistrate was also
in effect the public prosecutor. He examined the accused ex-
haustively, as well as witnesses, to build a case against the ac-
cused, and frequently he appeared at the trial as a prosecution
witness." This inquisitorial and summary procedure'0 became
an effective discovery device against the accused, already handi-
capped by a presumption of guilt. Though the depositions of
the witnesses were recorded, they were for the information of
the court only; the accused had no access to them. Whatever
5. Bailment of Persons Act, 1554, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13.
6. 1 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 237-38 (1883).
7. Bailment of Persons Act, 1554, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13.
8. Examination of Prisoners Act, 1555, 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10. In 1826 the
preliminary hearing was extended to persons accused of misdemeanors. Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice Act, 1826, 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, § 3.
9. Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in
Europe and America, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 458-59 (1935).
10. "I do not think any part of the old procedure operated more harshly
upon prisoners than the summary and secret way in which justices of the peace,
acting frequently the part of detective officers, took their examinations and




light they threw on his guilt or innocence, he remained in outer
darkness. 1
There is much to indicate that he remained there meekly.
The failure to protest, indicated by the paucity of cases over
a span of centuries, emerges in retrospect as a comment on the
futility of protest. It is a long way in time from 1554 to 1792
when the well-known case of The King v. Holland'2 served but
to confirm how far removed the accused still was from discovery
of the prosecution's information about him, whether of incrimi-
nating or exonerating nature. Defendant Holland learned in no
uncertain terms that discovery was a one-way route, even when
it led all the way to India. In the words of the reporter:
A board of inquiry having been appointed in India, for ex-
amining into certain charges of peculation and corruption against
the defendant . . . and that board having examined witnesses and
made a report of the matter, which was transmitted home: in
consequence of which an information had been filed by the At-
torney General against the defendant . . . a rule nisi was obtained
on the part of the defendant, for an inspection of that report....a
Defendant's counsel contended that the report of the investiga-
tion was a public document and that the defendant was under
great hardship in obtaining witnesses because of the distance of
the prosecution from the place where the crime was alleged to
have occurred.
Outrage at such presumption emanates from the words of
the Attorney General:
There never was yet an instance of such an application as
the present, to give the defendant an opportunity of inspecting the
evidence to be produced against him upon a public prosecution.
It would lead to the most mischievous consequences.... A defend-
11. An extraordinary exception was the one accused of treason, though even
he received no more before trial than a copy of the indictment, Act for Trials in
Cases of Treason, 1695, 7 & 8 Wil. 3, c. 3, and a list of "names, profession, and
place of abode" of witnesses and jurors to be produced at the trial, Act for Im-
proving the Union of the Two Kingdoms, 1708, 7 Anne, c. 21, § 11.
This was considered as an extraordinary effort of liberality. It proves, in
fact, that even at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and after the
experience of the state trials held under the Stuarts, it did not occur to the
legislature that, if a man is to be tried for his life, he ought to know before-
hand what the evidence against him is, and that it did appear to them that
to let him know even what were the names of the witnesses was so great a
favour that it ought to be reserved for people accused of a crime for
which legislators themselves or their friends and connections were likely
to be prosecuted. It was a matter of direct personal interest to many
members of parliament that trials for political offences should not be
grossly unfair, but they were comparatively indifferent as to the fate of
people accused of sheep-stealing, or burglary, or murder.
1 Stephen, supra note 6, at 225-26.
12. 4 T.R. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792).
13. Ibid.
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ant might as well apply for the examinations of witnesses before
a grand jury on a common bill of indictment. . . . The effect of this
application, if successful, would be not only to inform the defend-
ant who were the witnesses to be examined against him but also
the whole detail of their evidence.14
Clearly it did not become one who was presumed guilty to
presume that he could discover why.
The judges saw eye to eye with the Attorney General, and
their statements were a fugue of shock. To Buller, J., "the prac-
tice on common law indictments, and on informations on par-
ticular statutes, shews it to be clear that this defendant is not
entitled to inspect the evidence, on which the prosecution is
founded, till the hour of trial."15 Moreover, added Grose, J.,
"if we were to assume a discretionary power of granting this
request, it would be dangerous in the extreme . . . ."z His col-
league, Ashurst, J., took up the proprieties, molto grasioso: "Nor
was it ever conceived to be necessary or fit that he should receive
intelligence of the particular evidence by which the charge was
to be made out. And I should be sorry if such a rule were to be
laid down in any case." 7 It was left to Lord Kenyon, C. J.,
to sound the thunderous notes of subversion: "Nor was such
a motion as the present ever made; and if we were to grant it,
it would subvert the whole system of criminal law .6. .. n1a
The thunderous notes of the eighteenth century in the
mother country still resounded in the twentieth century in the
United States with an authority undiminished by their anachro-
nism." Ironically, these filial echoes of the distant past con-
tinued, and even now are occasionally heard, despite the nine-
teenth-century reforms in England that ended practices out of
tune with the times.
Some years after The King v. Holland, two English courts
allowed the defense investigation of evidence against it. In 1848,
a recorder of the Central Criminal Court granted, albeit with
reservations, a "very unusual application" of two sisters accused
of poisoning a child to examine both the contents of the de-
ceased's stomach and "a certain medicine" that the prosecution
14. Id. at 691-92, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1248-49.
15. Id. at 694, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1250.
16. Ibid.
17. Id. at 693, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1249.
18. Id. at 692, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1249.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923)
(L. Hand, J.); State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953) (Vander-
bilt, C. J.); People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 25, 156 N.E. 84
(1927) (Cardozo, C. J.).
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planned to produce at the trial.20 The recorder commented, "I
have less difficulty in granting this application because the judge
would no doubt at the trial stop the case until such examination
had been made."2 ' The King's Bench had asserted its power more
firmly several years earlier when it deposited a threatening letter
with the clerk of the court for inspection by the defendant's
witnesses. 2 2
The nineteenth-century reforms at long last corrected the
most flagrant abuses of the preliminary examination and went
far to insure the defendant a fair trial. Early in the century, it
was already obsolescent for justices of the peace to interrogate
prisoners,2 8 though the practice was not officially terminated
until 1848.24 The preliminary hearing took on an adversary
aspect not unlike that of the trial itself. In 1836 the accused was
given the right to legal representation 2 5 and the right to inspect
the testimony at the preliminary hearing.26 In 1848, he was
given the right to cross-examine witnesses.27 In 1867, he was
given the right to call witnesses and to present a defense.2 8
Finally, in 1898, he acquired the right to be heard in his own de-
fense." Gradually the preliminary hearing took over the grand
jury's function of determining whether there was good cause to
commit the defendant for trial, and in 1933 the long anomalous
grand jury was abolished.80
Thus, the preliminary hearing has come a long way from its
original purpose of precluding connivance between "the greatest
and noblest offenders" and errant justices of the peace. In
modern practice the prosecution usually makes a prima facie
case, and the magistrate therefore seldom refuses to commit the
20. Regina v. Spry, 3 Cox Crim. Cas. 221 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1848).
21. Ibid. Compare The Queen v. Connor, 1 Cox Crim. Cas. 233-34 (Nisi
Prius, 1845), where Patteson, J., held that he had no power to allow the accused
to examine the list of grand jury witnesses, but observed, "At the same time,
I think there ought not to be any opposition offered to that application." The
prosecution then consented.
22. Rex v. Harrie, 6 Car. & P. 105, 172 Eng. Rep. 1165 (Nisi Prius, 1833).
23. Preliminary Investigations of Criminal Off ences, 1960 Crim. L. Rev.
(Eng.) 793, 809 (Third Annual Report, Committee of Justice, British Section of
the International Commission of Jurists).
24. See Indictable Offences Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, § 24.
25. Prisoners' Counsel Act, 1836, 6 & 7 Wil. 4, c. 114, §§ 1-2.
26. Prisoners' Counsel Act, 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, §§ 3-4.
27. Indictable Offences Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, § 17.
28. Administration of the Criminal Law Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 35, § 3.
29. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, § 1.
30. Administration of Justice (Misc. Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5,
c. 36, § 1. See generally Burrows, Criminal Law and Procedure, 51 L.Q. Rev. 36,
49-52 (1935); Elliff, Notes on the Abolition of the English Grand Jury, 29
J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 3 (1938).
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defendant to trial.8' The preliminary hearing, now serving pri-
marily as a discovery device for the benefit of the defense, affords
it a safeguard against ill-founded prosecutions as well as sub-
stantial protection against surprise at the trial.
Of those now prosecuted upon an indictment, almost all
are entitled to a preliminary hearing. 2 At the hearing the pros-
ecution opens with a brief statement of its case and must then
call sufficient witnesses and present sufficient evidence to make
out a prima facie case against the accused. In practice, the pros-
ecution presents evidence of all the most important matters
upon which it relies to prove the accused's guilt. The defense
may be represented at the preliminary hearing by counsel or
solicitor" and may both cross-examine the witnesses and ques-
tion them to gain relevant information."
The testimony of a witness is not taken down verbatim, but
is recorded in narrative form by a clerk. The penned recordation
is now giving way to a mechanical recording of the clerk's dicta-
ted narrative, which is subsequently put in typewritten form
and read to the witness. (It is not clear whether a witness is
given automatically, or even upon request, a copy to read for him-
self.) Once he approves the statement as representing his testi-
mony, he and the examining magistrate sign it,35 and it becomes
his deposition, available to the defendant for a small fee."
In contrast, there is widespread commitment in the United
States to verbatim transcripts. The prevailing opinion is that,
however inadequate or rambling or inexact the words of a witness
31. Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England 111 (1958); Harrison,
Advocacy at Petty Sessions 8, 21-22 (1956); Walsh, Some Suggested Reforms in
Connection With Courts of Summary Jurisdiction, 18 L.T. 239, 240 (1935).
32. Although the grand jury has been abolished, the accusation on which
most important crimes are prosecuted is still called an "indictment." Compare text
accompanying notes 98-104 infra. Several other methods of prosecuting indictable
offenses are still available. A judge of the high court can directly commit an
accused to trial without a preliminary hearing. See Administration of Justice (Misc.
Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 2 (2) (5). Any judicial officer can
directly commit to trial a person whom he determines has committed perjury
before him, Perjury Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 6, § 9(1). A coroner can give
leave for a bil of indictment to be preferred by inquisition after an inquest,
Coroners (Amendment) Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 25(1). The Queen's
Attorney General can file an information ex officio for certain aggravated mis-
demeanors. See Administration of Justice (Misc. Provisions) Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo.
6, c. 63, § 12. See also note 101 infra and accompanying text. These methods are
apparently almost never used, however. See Devlin, supra note 31, at 12S-27;
Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice § 311 (35th ed. 1962).
33. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6, 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 99
[hereinafter cited as Magistrates' Courts Act].
34. Magistrates' Courts Act § 4(3); Devlin, supra note 31, at 71.
35. Magis. Ct. R. 5(1), Stat. Instr., 1952, No. 2190.
36. Magis. Ct. R. 13, Stat. Instr., 1952, No. 2190.
[Vol. 39: 749754
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may be, they are the only genuine statement of his version of
the facts. However explanatory or concise or exact the narrative
of a transcribing clerk, it falls short of the story of the witness
in his own words. There is an abrasion of the original in even the
most conscientious retelling, for it cannot encompass all the
revealing connotations of unedited speech. Talented though the
narrator may be in seizing upon significant characteristic phrases,
his rendition still lacks the personality of the witness. When
the narrator improves on the telling of the story, particularly by
stripping it of verbiage, he may effect a great saving of paper
work, but is there not a corresponding risk of some cost to the
truth? Such a risk is not automatically conjured away when the
witness by his signature transforms the narrative into his own
deposition. A witness who is less than adept in the telling of
a story may also be less than alert in approving the retelling."
If the prosecution wishes to present evidence at the trial
that it obtained before trial, but subsequent to the preliminary
hearing, or evidence that for some other reason it did not present
there, it serves a Notice of Additional Evidence upon the de-
fense. 8 The notice sets forth not only the names and addresses
of the additional witnesses that the prosecution plans to call,
but also the gist of the evidence it plans to introduce. 9
The prosecution can still introduce evidence at the trial to
impeach defense witnesses even though it neither introduced
such evidence at the preliminary hearing nor gave subsequent
notice thereof to the defense. 40 The prosecution, however, can-
not introduce new evidence or present new witnesses on re-
buttal except on matters arising in the course of the defense
ex improviso that no human ingenuity could have foreseen.41
The prosecution may have evidence before the trial to impeach
37. Cf. Preliminary Investigations of Criminal Offences, supra note 23, at 798.
See also Regina v. Wainwright, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 171, 173 (Cent. Crim. Ct.
1875).
38. Memorandum by Mervyn Griffith-Jones, Q.C., Pretrial Discovery to the
Defence, p. 1, presented at discussion held at London Sessions, July 16, 1963. See
Ex parte Downes, [1954] 1 Q.B. 1, 6-7.
39. Archbold, supra note 32, § 1375; Devlin, supra note 31, at 113-16. The
courts do not hold such evidence inadmissible when the prosecution has failed to
give notice, but they will give the accused an adjournment (equivalent to our
continuance) if he is taken by surprise. See, e.g., Rex v. Wright, 25 Crim. App.
R. 35, 39-40 (Ct. Crim. App. 1934); Regina v. Greenslade, 11 Cox Crim. Cas.
412 (Nisi Prius, 1870); Regina v. Ward, 2 Car. & K. 760, 175 Eng. Rep. 319 (Nisi
Prius, 1848).
40. See Rex v. Froggatt, 4 Crim. App. R. 115, 119-20 (Ct. Crim. App.
1910). See generally Criminal Procedure Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., c. 18, § 5;
Archbold, supra note 32, § 1391.
41. Regina v. Flynn, 42 Crim. App. R. 15 (1957); The King v. Harris,
[1927] 2 K.B. 587, 594-95; Archbold, supra note 32, § 552.
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witnesses it anticipates the defense will call. Even if the prose-
cution withholds such evidence at the outset as a reserve to be
called forth at the trial only if needed for bona fide impeach-
ment and not for a surprise offensive, such use is still akin
to trial by surprise. Successful impeachment of a single witness
can impair the entire defense in the eyes of a jury. The sur-
prising effect of evidence may indeed be augmented when it
comes out of hiding for impeachment. There is a patent dis-
harmony between such surprise and the spirit of the preliminary
hearing, disclosure to the defense of "the whole of the material
that will be put against them."'
What militates against the logic of full-fledged disclosure
by the prosecution is the present freedom of the defense to
surprise the prosecution at the trial."' For tactical reasons, it sel-
dom discloses its case at the preliminary hearing," though it is
free to do so. Even an accused with a strong defense is wary of
disclosing it in the hope of a dismissal, given the risk that the
case will proceed to trial and he would then have lost the tactic
of surprise. There are those who believe that the resources of
the accused are generally so unequal to those of the state as to
justify a compensating advantage. Nevertheless, it is now argued
forcefully that the tactic of surprise has no logical place in
modern procedure even for the defense."
An accused relying on the defense of insanity may disclose
it before trial to enlist the full cooperation of state doctors.a7
Again, a defendant with a strong alibi may be inclined to disclose
it rather than to provoke adverse judicial comment at the trial
for not presenting the alibi earlier. In addition to such volun-
tary disclosure by the defense, some disclosure may be obliquely
available to the prosecution. Thus, an indigent accused of a
42. Devlin, supra note 31, at 112.
43. Magis. Ct. R. 5 (6), Stat. Instr., 1952, No. 2190; see Napley, Aspects of
Criminal Defences 15 (Synopsis of Talk in the Benchers' Room, Lincoln's Inn,
July 11, 1963).
44. See Harrison, supra note 31, at 22-23; Napley, supra note 43, at 9, 16.
45. Consider the dramatic effect of the nurses' notes in Regina v. Adams,
discussed in Palmer, Dr. Adams' Trial for Murder, 1957 Crim. L. Rev. (Eng.) 365,
and Palmer, Lessons of a Cross-Examination, id. at 773.
46. Williams, Advance Notice of the Defence, 1959 Crim. L. Rev. (Eng.)
548; Preliminary Investigations of Criminal Offences, supra note 23, at 818-24
(dissenting opinion of John Foster).
47. See Harrison, supra note 31, at 22. An accused in custody is examined by
both a prison doctor and an independent psychiatrist assigned by the Home
Office, and their reports are available to the defense before trial. In addition, the
government will pay for another examination by a doctor chosen by the defense.
48. See Devlin, supra note 31, at 108-09; Napley, supra note 43, at 16. But
cf. Williams, supra note 46, at 550-51. Compare Harrison, supra note 31, at 16.
[Vol. 39:*6749756
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crime other than murder must apply to the judge or magistrate
for legal aid,49 and one of the criteria for granting aid is "the
nature of such defense, if any, as may have been set up."50 In
practice, however, the magistrate seldom, if ever, requires dis-
closure of the defense.
In the main, however, the accused is well situated to invoke
surprise at the trial, particularly because he "need not reveal
the evidence he proposes to call, the documents he intends to
produce, or even the principal lines of his defence."5 ' Often the
surprise succeeds by default because the prosecution cannot get
an adjournment to search out any rebutting evidence.52 In a
procedure that has advanced so far to open up the prosecution's
case to the accused, while still affording him every safeguard
against self-incrimination, is there still need to give him addi-
tional protection from a counteroffensive when he himself takes
the offensive by striking from ambush?53
In the discovery it affords an accused who is prosecuted
upon an indictment, the preliminary hearing in England is far
in advance of pretrial discovery in federal procedure and in most
state procedures in the United States. My own experience has
been in the atypical jurisdiction of California where, within the
last decade, criminal discovery has been opened up to an un-
precedented extent. I am accordingly prompted to take more
than passing note of what are comparatively substantial limi-
tations on criminal discovery in England.
Discovery by way of the preliminary hearing is limited to
admissible evidence; it is further limited to such admissible evi-
dence as the prosecution plans to offer at the trial. One can
readily comprehend the force of these limitations by taking
account of how much is thus placed beyond the right of dis-
covery. When the accused has no right to discover material,
however reasonably related to his case, that would be inadmis-
sible at the trial, he can only hope that the prosecution will
accord him such a boon informally. Otherwise, he is cut off
not only from such material, but from any leads therefrom that
might have proved helpful and even indispensable for the fer-
reting out of admissible evidence. He can be cut off, for example,
49. Poor Prisoners' Defence Act, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 32, § 1(3).
50. Ibid.
51. Preliminary Investigation of Criminal Offences, supra note 23, at 813.
52. See Minutes of Discussion Held at London Sessions 1, July 16, 1963
(comment by Mervyn Griffith-Jones, Q.C.); cf. Devlin, supra note 31, at 77.
53. Compare Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 879 (1962), discussed in Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Dis-
covery, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 228, 246-50 (1963).
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from all material deemed inadmissible by the unruly rules on
hearsay, even though hearsay is often rich with clues to the
truth. Of course he can have no right to privileged material, for
he could not arrive at such material without trampling out the
privilege.
When the accused cannot discover even admissible evidence
because the prosecution does not plan to offer it at the trial and
he is not informally accorded access to it, he may be all the
more handicapped in the preparation of his defense. Once the
prosecution decides against the use of such evidence, it might be
most helpful to the defense to know why. Instead, it is cut off
from evidence that might be of greater value to it than that
actually presented by the prosecution at the preliminary hearing.
Thus, if the defense has discovered some part of the in-
formation given to the police by a prosecution witness who has
testified at the preliminary hearing, but is compelled to remain
in the dark as to the rest, it may be frustrated in its efforts to
make effective use of what it has discovered. The part is not
equal to the whole. Worse still, it may suggest to the defense
a picture of the whole that is misleading.
The defense is no less at a disadvantage when it has no
access whatever to a statement to the police because it is given
by one not called at the preliminary hearing. Though the pros-
ecution is expected to present all "obvious witnesses,"" it n.eed
not give the defense the statements of persons it interviewed
and rejected as witnesses.
The prosecution, however, must give the names and ad-
dresses of such persons to the defense prior to the trial when
their statements "contain material which may be useful to the
Defence."55 The determination of what may be useful to the
defense is apparently left to the prosecution. If so, the likely ra-
tionalization is that the prosecution is best situated to clear the
decks at the outset of those who give no prospect of becoming
useful witnesses for either side.
This explanation must proceed from the presupposition
that the prosecution is at least as good a judge of such matters
as the defense. That is a large presupposition, though it takes
on some plausibility in light of the traditions governing English
practice. Barristers, for example, serve with equal readiness
54. Devlin, supra note 31, at 72.
55. Memorandum by Mervyn Griffith-Jones, Q.C., supra note 38, at 2; see
Rex v. Bryant, 31 Crim. App. R. 146, 151-52 (Ct. Crim. App. 1946); Devlin, supra
note 31, at 73. Some older cases indicate that the prosecutor need not disclose the
name of an informer, see Marks v. Beyfus, [1890] 25 Q.B. 494, 498-99, 500, but
their current soundness is doubtful, see note 94 infra.
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CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
either in a prosecution or in a defense, or upon occasion even as a
judge in the capacity of recorder or chairman of a quarter ses-
sions court. Moreover, anyone who undertakes a prosecution for
the Crown has a responsibility "to put all relevant information
fairly before the court in the interests of justice,"5" and responsi-
bility on so elevated a plane does not admit of unseemly zeal for
conviction. In contrast, "it is the duty of counsel for the defence
to use all legitimate means to obtain an acquittal."57
Though a representative of the prosecution is thus less a
determined adversary than an expositor, does it follow that he
is accordingly best qualified to determine what is of importance
to the defense? Is it not expecting too much of even the most
fair-minded prosecutor that he be also the judge of what wit-
nesses the defense should know about? His very freedom from
zeal may dull his judgment in this regard. Why not let the
defense judge for itself? Its very zeal might sharpen its judg-
ment. True, it cannot judge for itself without seeing the state-
ments, but why not let it see the statements? The reason for
withholding them is "that the statements may be used by the
Prosecution to cross-examine the witness if he is called by the
Defence and gives evidence varying from what he told the
police."5 8 If the defense could examine such statements before
trial, however, it probably would not prejudice its case by calling
a witness who had changed his story. In a proceduore that has
advanced so far toward discovery, is there still need for this
element of surprise?"
As to the evidence that the defense does discover at the
preliminary hearing, does it ordinarily have adequate time to
check the evidence in preparation for the trial? There seems
to be general agreement that the defense ordinarily has less
time for preparation than the prosecution. One obvious reason
is that the police usually make so thorough an investigation
preliminary to an arrest that the case for the prosecution is
virtually completed by the time an arrest is made. It can be
laborious as well as costly for the defense to retrace, even with
the benefit of discovery at the preliminary hearing, all the ground
that the police have covered. Even though the barrister who
appears for the accused at the trial may specialize in criminal
law, whatever defense he presents must rest on the preparatory
56. Napley, The Criminal Trial-Anglo-American Procedure Compared, 60
L. Soc'y Gazette 582, 583 (1963).
S7. Williams, Proof of Guilt 30 (2d ed. 1958).
58. Memorandum by Mervyn Griffith-Jones, Q.C., supra note 38, at 2.
59. Compare Traynor, supra note 53, at 244.
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work of a solicitor, who ordinarily conducts his investigations
as best he can in the course of a general practice. 0 At best, the
defense can hardly hope to match the resources and skills of
the police. The handicap of the defense may be all the greater
if it lacks adequate time to prepare for the trial.
The preliminary hearing, which gives the defense its first
acquaintance with the prosecution's case, normally occurs some
four or five weeks after arrest.61 During most, if not all, of the
interval, the accused is usually without representation; many an
accused is without representation even at the preliminary hear-
ing.6 When a representative for the defense does enter the case
at the preliminary hearing, his preparation for the trial may
not always be expedited as it should be by discovery of what the
prosecution's case is. Ordinarily, he has an interval of no more
than four or five weeks between the preliminary hearing and
the trial in which to prepare the defense." In a complicated
case, however, additional time may be granted on a bona fide
showing that it is necessary, and the courts never insist that
the trial take place until there has been sufficient time to
insure that the defense is or ought to be ready. Few would
disagree that it is in the interest of the accused that the charges
against him be put to the test of proof without undue delay. It
appears equally in the interest of the public that the charges be
resolved promptly, whether for or against the accused. There
is always a danger, however, of blind acceptance of dispatch per
se. If there is undue dispatch at the expense of due deliberation,
there can be consequences as grievous as capital punishment of
the innocent. Can time ever be so precious as to be saved at such
a cost? 64
60. Napley, supra note 43, at 8.
61. A summary trial (i.e., not on an indictment before a jury) will normally
be heard within a maximum of four or five weeks after arrest. Indeed
even that period is a present cause of complaint of undue delay, given the
congestion of the courts. A trial on indictment will ordinarily be concluded
after the lapse of a further four or five weeks.
Id. at 7-8. See generally statistical tables in Home Office Research Unit, Time Spent
Awaiting Trial 3-18 (1960).
62. The Poor Prisoners' Defence Act of 1930 provided that indigents should
be granted legal aid for the preliminary hearing only "by reason of the gravity of
the charge or of exceptional circumstances." 20 Geo. 5, c. 32, § 2. Although this pro-
vision was repealed in 1949, Legal Aid & Advice Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51,
§ 18(2), it is still unusual for free legal aid to be granted for the preliminary hear-
ing, see Devlin, supra note 31, at 130.
63. See note 61 supra.
64. See Kennedy, Ten Rillington Place (1961). Compare: "The distortion of
justice worked by an overly solicitous procedural system is illustrated by the
case of Caryl Chessman, who was kept under the shadow of death for twelve
years." Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed 27 (1963).
760 [Vol. 39: 749
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
Such serious questions must still be resolved in the operation
of criminal discovery, even in so advanced a procedure as the
preliminary hearing in England. Nevertheless, one must remain
mindful of how great an advance it is beyond trial by ordeal,
trial by battle, trial by compurgation oath, and trial by blind-
man's buff.
With the preliminary hearing as a background, we can now
turn to long-standing traditions, grounded neither in the common
law nor in statutes, but securely grounded in custom, that afford
to the defense some grand avenues of pretrial discovery. "Med-
ical Reports are always supplied to the Defence" ;65 these in-
clude any report of a prison doctor as to the mental condition
of the accused.66 Moreover, the prosecution makes police labo-
ratory reports available to the defense, often upon its own initia-
tive and always upon request. It automatically supplies any
reports that appear "to be of value to the Defence."" Such
disclosure is limited to scientific findings. If the defense wants
them interpreted, it must employ its own experts, but it can
obtain legal aid for that purpose if necessary. 68
The defense is not informed "of experiments which were
abortive or unsuccessful from the prosecution viewpoint."" On
the other hand, the Forensic Science Laboratories, operated by
the government primarily to serve the prosecution, are also
available to the defense. If the defense makes use of the police
laboratories for scientific tests, however, the police are inevitably
apprised of the findings. 0 Of course the defense has recourse at
its own expense to other laboratories and experts whose evidence
will remain unknown to the prosecution until it is presented at
the trial. If the defense wishes to have its own experts examine
something that has been put in evidence by the prosecution, the
court will allow the defense solicitor or expert to have it for that
purpose, unless there are compelling reasons for not doing so.
As to the disclosure of documents not presented at the
preliminary hearing, the traditional English practice has been
summarized as follows:
Defence solicitors are always given facilities to examine and
take copies of all documents which the Police have seized from the
Accused or have obtained from other sources.
65. Memorandum by Mervyn Griffith-Jones, Q.C., supra note 38, at 4.
66. See Rex v. Casey, 32 Crim. App. R. 91 (Ct. Crim. App. 1947).
67. Memorandum by Mervyn Griffith-Jones, Q.C., supra note 38, at 4.
68. Ibid.; Devlin, supra note 31, at 74.
69. Napley, supra note 43, at 9-10.
70. Id. at 10; see Williams, supra note 57, at 126.
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When any such documents appear to be of use to the De-
fence, the Defence are notified and given facilities for inspection.7'
In conjunction, these two statements apparently mean that such
documents are available to the defense upon request and that
in any event the prosecution, whenever it comes upon any docu-
ments that appear useful to the defense, will on its own initiative
notify the defense accordingly. This practice appears more liberal
than the corresponding practice in the federal courts of the
United States. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the prosecution makes no disclosure on its own initiative; nor
does it disclose, even upon request, documents obtained from
third persons other than by seizure or by process.72
Moreover, the Federal Rules have been interpreted as pre-
cluding an accused from discovering his purported confession on
the ground that he has no property right therein. In contrast,
the defense in England has ready access to any statement written
and signed by the accused.78 Indeed, when such statements are
admissible, the prosecution always puts them in evidence at the
preliminary hearing "whether they be favourable to the Prosecu-
tion or Defence."I" Statements "which are not admissible e.g.
because obtained in breach of the Judges Rules . .. are supplied
to the Defence before trial."75 In addition, "statements made
by each of several Accused are known to the Defence either by
being put in as evidence on a joint committal or, if no joint
committal, by copies supplied to the Defence."7
It is, however, quite otherwise with oral statements of the
accused. Ordinarily, the prosecution does not reveal the gist of
such statements. 7 Such taciturnity is surprising in a context of
disclosure.
The criminal record of an accused is readily available to his
legal representative without the necessity of specific authorization
by the accused.78 Such disclosure is essential to the defense so
that it can determine whether it can safely put the character of
71. Memorandum by Mervyn Griffith-Jones, Q.C., supra note 38, at 4.
72. See discussion of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16 in
Traynor, supra note 53, at 234. In both federal and state courts, the defense can
sometimes compel discovery at the trial on constitutional grounds. See note 1
supra.
73. Harrison, supra note 31, at 3. Compare Preliminary Investigations of
Criminal Offences, supra note 23, at 795-99.
74. Memorandum by Mervyn Griffith-Jones, Q.C., supra note 38, at 4.
75. Ibid.
76. Id. at 5; see Judges' Rule 8.
77. Napley, supra note 43, at 10; see Preliminary Investigations of Criminal
Offences, supra note 23, at 795-99.
78. Practice Note, 39 Crim. App. R. 20 (1955).
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the accused in issue. The prosecution also makes ready disclosure
of any criminal records of prosecution witnesses that might be
useful to the defense for impeachment."
In theory the defense may also interview prosecution wit-
nesses.
It is the undoubted right of a solicitor to see any witness
who, he thinks, may assist his client's case. The ruling of the Law
Society on this matter is that there is no property in a witness and
that, so long as there is no question of tampering with the witness
or seeking to persuade him to alter his story, it is open to the
solicitor for either party, in civil or criminal proceedings, to inter-
view and take a statement from any witness, or prospective wit-
ness, at any stage of the proceedings, whether or not that witness
has been interviewed or indeed called as a witness by the other
party.80
There is a reasonable qualification: the right is to be asserted,
not "at any stage of the proceedings," but only before a prose-
cution witness has testified either at the preliminary hearing or
at the trial.81
There are additional limitations, however, that make the
"undoubted right" a dubious one. The prosecution need not dis-
79. See Regina v. Collister, 39 Crim. App. R. 100, 104-05 (Ct. Crim. App.
1955).
80. Sir Theobald Mathew, The Department of the Director of Public Prose-
cutions 15 (1952). Sir Theobald adds: "With one possible exception . . . I
do not quarrel with that general statement." His exception is set forth in
note 81 infra.
81. Turning now to the exception to The Law Society ruling to which I
referred: I consider that a different situation arises when a witness has
given evidence before the examining justices, and I am supported in this
view by a number of judicial pronouncements. Mr. Justice Avory as long
ago as 1922 in a case at Winchester Assizes said: "I think it is my duty
to say that it is quite improper for the solicitor for the defence to be
communicating with the witnesses who are about to give evidence and
especially those who have already given evidence before the magistrates."
Mr. Justice Humphreys also expressed the view that, once a person had
appeared in the witness box before the examining Magistrates, that person
should not be interviewed concerning his evidence by the defending solici-
tor, and, in one case, he went so far as to say "nor by the prosecution,
once the person has given evidence in a Magistrates' Court." Next there
was a case in 1943 at Manchester Assizes in which, according to the report
in The Times, a witness for the prosecution said that a few days before
the trial she went to the offices of the defending solicitor and went through
her statement in the presence of the solicitor's clerk. Mr. Justice Lewis
said: "For a solicitor or his clerk, when instructed by the prisoner, to inter-
view a witness for the prosecution, is most reprehensible. I am not saying
whether the girl's evidence is true or not, but if it is true I take an ex-
tremely serious view of it . . .. "
There is, however, a class of witness-the expert or the professional-
doctors, chartered accountants and the like, who are frequently seen by
the defence . . . for the purpose of elucidating their evidence given before
the examining justices. The witness to whom I have been referring is the
ordinary witness as to fact, the value of whose testimony depends upon his
credibility and recollection.
Sir Theobald Mathew, supra note 80, at 16.
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close the names and addresses of its prospective witnesses before
the preliminary hearing; it is up to the solicitor for the defense,
if there is one to represent the accused at this stage, to ferret
them out on his own. If the solicitor does become knowledgeable
in this regard, he usually feels constrained not to talk with the
ordinary prosecution witness for fear of incurring the suspicion
that he has tampering in mind.
Such constraints appear anomalous in England, where prac-
tice in the main reflects an environment hospitable to disclosure.
Can it be that the purported right of the defense to talk with
prosecution witnesses remains a ghost of a right because of
phantom fears? Then what next if not to give up the ghost?
In the presence of like fears, my state has made way for
a substantial right, and there is no indication so far that it has
been exercised corruptly. As I have noted in the companion
article on discovery in the United States,82 the defense in Cali-
fornia is entitled to pretrial discovery of the names and addresses
of prospective witnesses." If necessary, it may also obtain a
court order that the prosecution refrain from interfering with
defense counsel's right to seek interviews with them."' It seems
reasonable to speculate that wherever the process of fact-finding
and verification becomes more open, there is correspondingly
less opportunity for operations in the dark.
Even at the trial stage in English practice, there are con-
straints on discovery of prosecution witnesses by the defense,
though these constraints may be mitigated voluntarily by the
prosecution.
There is no obligation on the Prosecution to call any witness
at Trial, whether or not the witness has given evidence for the
Prosecution at the Magistrates Court. If the witness is likely to be
more favourable to the Defence than to the Prosecution, Prosecut-
ing Counsel can refuse to call him and so leave it to the Defence
to call him as a witness for the Defence, thus retaining the ad-
vantage of being able to cross-examine him if the Defence do call
him.
On the other hand, if the witness has given evidence at the
Magistrates Court, and is wanted by the Defence at The Trial,
82. Traynor, supra note 53, at 244.
83. People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 246-47, 384 P.2d 16, 29, 32 Cal. Rptr.
424, 437 (1963); Norton v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 2d 133, 136, 343 P.2d
139, 141 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); see People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 770, 349
P.2d 964, 973, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148, 157 (1960).
84. People v. Cooper, supra note 83, at 770-71, 349 P.2d at 973-74, 3 Cal.
Rptr. at 157-58; Yannacone v. Municipal Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1963); Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 743, 12 Cal. Rptr.
191, 193 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134,
140, 317 P.2d 130, 134 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
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Prosecuting Counsel may and often does assist the Defence by
calling him as a Prosecution witness and tendering him for cross-
examination by the Defence.85
The defense is even more seriously constrained when it must
depend upon the generosity of the prosecution to discover a prior
statement of one who testifies as a prosecution witness at the
trial.86
When the statement contains matter favourable to the De-
fence, Prosecuting Counsel hands a copy of it to Defence Counsel
before Trial.
When the witness says something in evidence (either in
chief or in cross-examination) which is contrary to what is stated
in his statement, Prosecuting Counsel hands a copy of the state-
ment (or the relevant passage-depending on the circumstances)
to Defence Counsel to enable Defence Counsel to cross-examine
the witness on it.
The foregoing suggests that the prosecution is not narrowly
preoccupied with holding back statements solely for their pos-
sible usefulness in the event one of its witnesses becomes hos-
tile.8 Even so, the prosecution remains the judge of when to
open the door; the defense cannot itself open it.89 It has been
noted earlier, 0 with regard to the prosecution's exclusive power
to judge what prospective witnesses shall be disclosed to the
defense, how dubious is the presupposition that the prosecution
is at least as good a judge as the defense of what can be useful
to the defense. The presupposition is no less dubious with regard
85. Memorandum by Mervyn Griffith-Jones, Q.C., supra note 38, at 3-4; see
Baksh v. The Queen, [1958] A.C. 167; Archbold, supra note 32, § 1374.
86. Again, whilst it is customary with us for the prosecution to serve upon
the accused person a copy of any statement which has been made by a
co-accused, the defence is never supplied with copies of statements made
by prosecution witnesses. Such knowledge as comes to the defence in this
regard is afforded virtually by the grace of the prosecuting advocate, who
either shows such statements to the defending advocate or acquaints him
with their substance. This, it may be thought, works particularly harshly
against unrepresented defendants, to whom the same facilities are not
available.
Napley, supra note 43, at 584.
87. Memorandum by Mervyn Griffith-Jones, Q.C., supra note 38, at 1.
88. Compare text accompanying note 59 supra.
89. There are rare exceptions. "When giving evidence at the trial the police
officer is entitled to use his notebook; and whether he does so or not, the defence
is entitled to call for it in order to compare his oral evidence with the entries he
has made." Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England 49 (1958). In Regina v.
Hall, 43 Crim. App. R. 29 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1958), the court ordered the prosecu-
tion to provide the defense with complete statements made by certain of the
prosecution witnesses to the police. We are warned, however, that this case is
limited to its peculiar facts and is not authority for the existence of a general duty
to provide the defense with witnesses' statements made to the police. Archbold,
supra note 32, § 1374.
90. See notes 55-59 supra and accompanying text.
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to the prosecution's exclusive power at the trial to determine
when a witness' prior statement "contains matter favourable to
the Defence" or when his testimony "is contrary to what is stated
in his statement."
Even when the prosecution opens the door to prior state-
ments, the defense has no way of knowing how much, if any-
thing, still remains behind the door, and no way of putting a
surmise to the test. It is still more serious at the trial than at
the pretrial stage for the defense to be at this distance from
discovery. With the soundness of final decision on the facts at
stake, should not the defense as a matter of right be able to
cross-examine a witness on the basis of all the available evidence,
inclusive of his prior statements? Can anything short of such a
right afford adequate insurance against the risks that attend any
determination of where the truth lies or does not lie?
Only with such a right can the defense fully execute its
responsibility of testing the credibility of prosecution witnesses
from the standpoint not only of consistency, but also of freedom
from bias or other motive for testifying deceptively. 1 It might
even find in a prior statement of a witness, conveying his fresh
impressions, the reinforcement of an affirmative defense or a clue
to one hitherto unknown.
Moreover, "the state has no interest in denying the accused
access to all-evidence that can throw light on issues in the case,
and in particular it has no interest in convicting on the testimony
of witnesses who have not been as rigorously cross-examined and
as thoroughly impeached as the evidence permits."9 2
In England, as in the United States, the defense is free to
use in cross-examination whatever prior statements of prosecu-
tion witnesses it has in its possession." It is hence all the more
perplexing that English procedure, in many respects ahead of
federal discovery procedure in the United States, should be com-
paratively restrictive as to discovery of prior statements. There
is little to suggest that the lifting of restrictions would lead to
unwarranted intrusion into confidential government files, par-
ticularly when such intrusion could easily be obviated. Under
the Jencks Act in the United States,94 for example, the judge
91. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667 (1957); Gordon v. United
States, 344 U.S. 414, 418 (1953); People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 585-88, 305
P.2d 1, 12-15 (1956); see McCormick, Evidence 1 19, 21, 37 (1954); S Wigmore,
Evidence 11 1367, 1397 (3d ed. 1940).
92. People v. Riser, supra note 91, at 585, 305 P.2d at 12.
93. See Alford v. United States, 282 US. 687, 692 (1931); McCormick, supra
note 91, 1119, 21, 37; Wigmore, supra note 91, §11367, 1397.
94. 18 US.C. § 3500(c) (1958). In 1942, the House of Lords established the
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deletes any part of a prior statement that does not relate to the
testimony at the trial, thus effecting "a compromise of sorts be-
tween the defendant's right to use the statements and the Gov-
ernment's need to withhold information not relating to the
witness's testimony."95
Whatever the formal restrictions on discovery, there is some
relaxation on an informal basis under what the English charac-
terize with bantering aptness as the "Old Boys Act." Though
it is nowhere to be found in the statute books, and is far from
equivalent to tradition with the force of custom, the "Old Boys
Act" is acted out frequently enough to give it the force of a
realistic practice, if not of law or custom.98 Given the high
standards of the legal profession in England, most defense solic-
itors qualify as Old Boys. Then, but only as a professional
courtesy, they may be allowed pretrial inspection of prosecution
information about the accused that would not otherwise be avail-
able under established practices.
The inadequacy of discovery by professional courtesy is
most apparent in summary trials, which proceed without benefit
of preliminary hearings. There can hardly be discovery by grace
of the prosecution to those who never even reach the state of
grace. The defendant who has no solicitor to represent him does
not have even a gambling chance to enter the pale of discovery.
Unfortunately, a great number of defendants are still not repre-
sented before or at the hearing on a summary trial or even on
indictable offenses.97
It is probably inevitable in any legal system that profes-
sional courtesy will be dispensed to some members of the pro-
fession and withheld from others. Any such uneven dispensation,
however, can be rationalized only on the assumptions that the
noble profession is in part ignoble and that it is appropriate for
the prosecution to sharpen the dichotomy by dispensations that
separate the Boys from the boys.
Though such professional courtesy in some measure reflects
doctrine of Crown Privilege: government documents whose admission would be
contrary to the public interest will be suppressed upon request of an appropriate
minister. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624. Although the basis
of this doctrine is similar to that underlying the objections made by the govern-
ment in the Jencks case, 353 U.S. 657, 670-71 (1957), objections based on this
doctrine are not made in criminal cases. See generally Note, Crime and Crown
Privilege, 1959 Crim. L. Rev. (Eng.) 10. See also Rex v. Clarke, 22 Crim. App. R.
58, 65-66 (Ct. Crim. App. 1930).
95. Traynor, supra note 53, at 238-39.
96. There is a comparable practice in the United States, as yet unnamed,
which might be characterized as "The Nice Guys Act." See Traynor, supra
note 53, at 237.
97. See remarks of David Napley at conference meeting July 21, 1963.
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recognition of discovery as a significant element in the search
for truth, its dispensation without benefit of clear standards is
at best fitful and inefficient, and at worst unjust. Even the re-
cipients of professional courtesy are subject to its vagaries. How-
ever impressive their Boyhood, it accords them no assurance
against swings in discovery privileges from riches to rags. Hence,
they may be timorous about using what they have discovered
lest they fall from grace.
Whatever the faults of English discovery procedures may
be, one can still be appreciative of their civilizing influence on
the trial process and hopeful that they will continue to improve
in their operation. What remains of grave concern, however, is
the meager scope of their operation. They are rarely available
to any but those prosecuted upon an indictment, who represent
only a small fraction of those accused of a criminal offense. In
1961, for example, they constituted only three per cent of the
total. Ninety-seven per cent were tried summarily before a magis-
trate without a jury."
An accused may be prosecuted upon an indictment for a
felony or a serious common law misdemeanor or, under special
circumstances, for a serious summary offense.99 Recent statistics
show, however, that well over four-fifths (eighty-four per cent
in 1961) of all indictable offenses are tried summarily.1 Those
accused of a felony other than the most serious, or of an indict-
able misdemeanor, may consent to summary trial,101 and most
do in view not only of its relatively high speed and low cost, e0
but also of the limited sentencing power of the magistrate.'e
98. Home Office, 1961 Criminal Statistics: England and Wales 6-15 (1962),
see Napley, Aspects of Criminal Defences 2 (Synopsis of Talk in the Benchers'
Room, Lincoln's Inn, July 11, 1963); Williams, supra note 57, at 302.
99. Magistrates' Courts Act 8 25(1), as amended, Sexual Offences Act, 1956,
4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 69, § 48. All summary offenses subject to a sentence of more than
three months, except assault and certain crimes relating to prostitutes, are in this
class.
100. Home Office, 1961 Criminal Statistics: England and Wales 6-11 (1962).
101. Magistrates' Courts Act § 19. Adults may be tried summarily on such
diverse charges as larceny, embezzlement, malicious damage, and indecent assault
on a minor. See Magistrates' Courts Act, schedule I, as amended, Criminal Justice
Administration Act, 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 15, schedule III. There is no right to
be tried summarily, however; the decision is within the magistrate's discretion.
102. See Harrison, Advocacy at Petty Sessions 6 (1956); Williams, supra
note 57, at 300. A convicted defendant can be ordered to pay the costs of the
prosecution. Costs in Criminal Cases Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6, 1 & 2 Eliz. 2, c.
48, § 2 (1). See also Howard, Criminal Justice in England 322-23 (1931).
103. Magistrates' Courts Act § 19(6) limits punishment to imprisonment for
six months and a fine of £100. If, however, a defendant convicted summarily seems
to deserve greater punishment than a magistrate can impose, he can be committed
to a trial judge for sentencing. Magistrates' Courts Act § 29.
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They make such a choice even though they have had no formal
opportunity to discover the prosecution's case. As for all others
who are tried summarily,104 they have no choice in the matter.
For all those who are tried summarily, there is little hope of
discovery. "[N]o information beyond that contained in the sum-
mons or charge, as to the nature or content of the prosecution,
is imparted to the defence until the case for the prosecution is
opened in Court."' 05
Though the preliminary hearing operates only in a token
fraction of cases, it nonetheless serves as a significant demonstra-
tion of discovery that bespeaks how little is lost by the decline
of surprise as a means of trapping the truth. It stands well in
comparison with federal and most state discovery procedures
in the United States. One is then bound to speculate whether so
luciferous a procedure should be adopted in Hesperia. The an-
swer might easily be affirmative, if there were a choice only
between the English example and prevailing procedures in the
Western Land. Now, however, there are the beginnings of pro-
cedures in the United States that give promise of fostering dis-
covery beyond that afforded by the preliminary hearing in Eng-
land.
Certainly it seems only a matter of time, given the now
definite trend toward expansion of pretrial discovery, until pros-
ecutors in the United States undertake on their own to disclose
at the preliminary hearing whatever discoverable evidence they
then have. Since even such disclosure might frequently be in-
adequate, the accused should still be able to resort to a motion
for discovery when necessary. With this supplemental device
available to him, it would become as unnecessary as it would be
inappropriate for the preliminary hearing to serve primarily
as a discovery device. Insofar as the defendant seeks informa-
tion going beyond the admissible evidence to be presented against
him, he raises issues collateral to the basic one of probable cause
to hold him for trial. Such issues are most appropriately deter-
mined in separate pretrial proceedings. The preliminary hearing
can then be left to its basic purpose of determining whether the
accused should stand trial.
*Moreover, the hearing can then assuredly be held promptly
after arrest to protect the rights of both the state and the ac-
cused. When there is probable cause to believe that the accused
is guilty, the police should be able to arrest him even though
104. See Harris, Criminal Law 535-89 (20th ed. 1960), for a brief descrip-
tion of the principal summary offenses.
105. Napley, supra note 98, at 10.
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they have yet to assemble their entire case against him. On the
other hand, the accused is entitled to have a magistrate deter-
mine as promptly as possible after his arrest whether there is
probable cause to hold him for trial even though the police have
not yet completed their investigation.
One must bear in mind that it is easier in a tight little island
than in a land of many jurisdictions, with consequent problems
of extradition, for the police to complete their investigation be-
fore arrest. In the island, the preliminary hearing may serve
without undue strain as a primary discovery device. In the vast
land, the preliminary hearing cannot well serve for much more
than a magistrate's objective determination as to whether there
is probable cause to hold an accused for trial.
Such differences do more than elucidate the stuff of com-
parative law. They also serve to remind us, in any advance upon
its dusky areas, how apt are the uses of diversity. It is no flat
world, this world of law, and we need many views as we envisage
how much of it still awaits discovery.
770
